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TOR TS-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION-ABOLITION OF THE PRIVITY 
REQUIREMENT-Defendants, professional consulting engineers, contracted 
with the city of Chattanooga to design a sewage system. As part of their 
performance of the contract they prepared a report of geological conditions 
which was to be distributed by the city to prospective bidders. Plaintiff, a 
tunneling subcontractor, had no dealings with the defendants, but did rely 
on their report in making its bid. Because one of defendant's draftsmen 
carelessly omitted pertinent geological information from the report, it 
took plaintiff three weeks longer to complete the work than had been antic-
ipated. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages for misrepresentation; held, 
plaintiff may recover. A person who makes a material and negligent mis-
representation in the course of a business transaction is liable for injuries 
suffered because of justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by any 
member of that class of persons whose reliance was reasonably foreseeable. 
Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 
1962).1 
Misrepresentation is one of the most perplexing areas of modem law. 
Courts and "lmters have taken almost every conceivable position,2 causing 
confusion in both theory and practice. Many of the difficulties can be 
traced to Lord Herschell's original formulation of the modem action of 
deceit. Despite its disarming appearance of clarity, this classic dictum in 
1 The name of the case derives from the fact that plaintiff's original suit was against 
the City of Chattanooga and another engineer as well as the defendants. The action 
was dismissed as to these other parties. Principal case at 825-26. 
2 Some of the most interesting case discussions are found in Cunningham v. C. R. Pease 
House Furnishing Co., 74 N.H. 435, 69 Atl. 120 (1908); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 
N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). Misrepresentation 
has received much attention from the writers. See, e.g., Bohlen, Misrepresentation as 
Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1929); Bohlen, Should Negligent 
Misrepresentation Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REv. 703 (1932); Carpen-
ter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. 
REv. 749 (1930); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REv. 749 (1930); Green, Innocent Misrepresenta-
tions, 19 VA. L. REv. 242 (1933); Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public 
Accountants, 12 VAND, L. REv. 797 (1959); Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties 
Otlzer Than His Employer for Negligent Misrepresentation, 1942 WIS. L. REv. 371; Seavey, 
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts (pts. 1-3), 52 HARv. L. REv. 372, 48 YALE L.J. 
390, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 20 (1939); Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. 
REv. 184 (1900); Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARv. L. REv. 415 
(1911). The four articles by Professors Bohlen and Green above form an interesting 
dialogue of competing ideas. 
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Derry v. Peek8 states the requirements of a deceit action in highly ambig-
uous terms. The rule is phrased in terms of "fraud," but, though one 
would ordinarily think that scienter must be shown to establish fraud, the 
Derry v. Peek rule allows recovery for misrepresentations made without 
belief in their truth, or made recklessly, careless whether they be true or 
false. Neither of these alternatives requires an intent to deceive. To com-
pound the ambiguity, the rule does not make clear what burden of proof 
a plaintiff in a deceit action must carry. Derry v. Peek requires "proof of 
fraud," but, as noted in the principal case,4 this could mean either that 
"fraud" must be proved, or merely that some proof-some evidence-of 
"fraud" must be adduced. Although most American courts regard Derry 
v. Peek as controlling authority and purport to demand fraudulent intent,5 
the ambiguous language used by the House of Lords has made it possible 
for courts to permit recovery in deceit based solely on an inference of 
fraud drawn from proof of negligence.6 
Another reason for the confusion is that several different legal theories 
can properly be applied to the typical factual situations in which misrep-
resentations arise. Although in Derry v. Peek the House of Lords was 
dealing only with deceit actions, the rule of that case has been taken by 
many courts to preclude any action for negligent or innocent misrepresen-
tation. In these courts, liability for false representation may be roughly 
characterized as requiring intentional wrong.7 The commercial transactions 
which give rise to claims of misrepresentation, however, often present facts 
which can be analyzed in terms of estoppel, rescission, warranty, or negli-
gence, as well as in terms of deceit.8 Consequently, courts which are un-
willing to confine misrepresentation to actions in deceit often impose 
3 "First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and 
nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that a 
false representation has been made (I) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or 
(3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 
(1889). 
4 Principal case at 827. 
5 E.g., C. W. Denning Co. v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 51 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1931); Dundee 
Land Co. v. Simmons, 204 Ga. 248, 49 S.E.2d 488 (1948); Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N.Y. 
124, 41 N.E. 414 (1895); Newman v. Kendall, 103 Vt. 421, 154 Atl. 662 (1931). 
6 Kimber v. Young, 137 Fed. 744 (8th Cir. 1905); Vincent v. Corbett, 94 Miss. 46, 47 
So. 641 (1908); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Shwab v. Walters, 147 Tenn. 
638, 251 s.w. 42 (1922). 
7 See cases cited in note 5 supra. As indicated in the text at note 6 supra, stating the 
rule in terms of fraud does not mean that actual intent to deceive is necessary. Even 
within its broad limits, however, the rule of Derry v. Peek requires more than mere 
negligence, though at times "gross" negligence may suffice. See, e.g., State St. Trust Co. 
v. Ernst, supra note 6. 
8 See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, supra note 2; 
Green, Deceit, supra note 2; Williston, supra note 2; and the interesting hypothetical 
case propounded in PROSSER, TORTS 531 (2d ed. 1955), where eight different remedies are 
open to a plaintiff who purchased a horse and a cow. 
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either strict liability9 or liability for negligence.10 The decision in the 
principal case amounts to an abandonment of deceit as the sole basis of 
1·esponsibility in favor of permitting an action for negligence.11 The ques• 
tion of the proper legal basis of responsibility for misrepresentation has 
been thoroughly and frequently discussed,12 and further comment here 
would not be fruitful. 
A third reason why courts and writers have failed to forge a consist-
ent body of law for dealing with misrepresentation arises from the diffi-
culty of determining the proper scope of liability. This issue has tradition-
ally been formulated in terms of whether a plaintiff must show that he was 
in privity with the misrepresenter in order to recover. Treating the prob-
lem in those terms,13 the principal case aligned itself with the American 
Law Institute14 by holding that privity is unnecessary and that the one 
making the misrepresentation is liable for all the foreseeable consequences 
of his negligence.15 It must be recognized, however, that when a court de-
cides whether privity is essential in order to recover for negligent mis-
representation, it is actually deciding the more fundamental question of 
who should bear the business, financial, or economic loss caused by reliance 
upon a negligent misrepresentation. Imposing a requirement of privity 
limits the scope of liability to parties who have a contractual relationship 
with the misrepresenter, and this necessarily means that many persons 
whose reliance was both justifiable and foreseeable will nonetheless be 
denied recovery for their loss. 
In the principal case the court attempted to show in several ways that 
there was no reason to be unduly concerned about the greater liability 
which ensues when privity is abandoned, but it had only one affirmative 
argument for expanding the liability of the misrepresenter.16 This argu-
ment has been the moving force behind the entire development of negli-
gence law and is embodied in the proposition that, as between an innocent 
party and a careless one, the party at fault should bear the loss. This is a 
o E.g., Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1950); New England Foundation Co. 
v. Elliott &: Watrous, Inc., 306 Mass. 177, 27 N.E.2d 756 (1940); Moulton v. Norton, 184 
Minn. 343, 238 N.W. 686 (1931). 
10 E.g., Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899); Weston v. Brown, 82 
N.H. 157, 131 Atl. 141 (1925); Houston v. Thornton, 122 N.C. 365, 29 S.E. 827 (1898). 
11 Athough the court phrased the question before it in terms of whether an action in 
deceit would lie for negligent misrepresentation, its discussion of contributory negligence 
as a defense indicates that the true import of the decision is that an action in negligence 
will lie for false representation. Principal case at 835-36. Note, however, the hint that 
the rule of this case might not extend to all negligent misrepresentations. The court 
specifically stated that it did not pass upon the question of whether a negligence-based 
action would lie in cases where the possibilities of liability are almost unlimited. Principal 
case at 833. 
12 The authorities are collected in Hawkins, supra note 2, at 812 n.68. 
13 Principal case at 832-35. 
14 3 llEsTATEMENT, TORTS § 552 (1938), 
111 Principal case at 832-35. 
10 Ibid. 
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persuasive principle, and by its force the holding of the principal case, 
that privity is unnecessary, must be admitted to be correct unless there are 
cogent countervailing arguments for affording professional people who 
supply information and opinions in the course of business transactions a 
partial immunity for their mistakes. 
The most substantial justification advanced in support of the privity 
requirement is predicated upon a supposed difference between injury to 
person or property and injury to a financial or business interest.17 The 
argument is that differences between these kinds of injury justify different 
scopes of liability for those who cause them. The court in the principal 
case felt that no such distinction could validly be made and dismissed the 
argument summarily,18 as have many writers.19 Although various attempts 
have been made to justify the distinction,20 only two seem sound enough to 
support the imposition of different scopes of liability. One rests on the 
greater difficulty of foreseeing the loss which might result from negligent 
words, and the other on the disproportionate injury which may be caused 
by misrepresentations. 
Since financial losses due to misrepresentation flow from the effect of 
words, whereas physical injuries and property damage usually result from 
physical forces, the chain of cause and effect which will convert a negligent 
act into personal injury or property damage will generally be more pre-
dictable, and hence the time, place, and nature of the loss more foreseeable. 
Of course, it might be foreseeable that negligent words would at some time 
and place cause someone injury of some sort, but to be legally foreseeable 
there must be more than this. The ethereal nature of words and the un-
seen and devious routes which guide them to their ultimate effect make it 
more likely that their consequences will not be legally foreseeable. Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche21 is the leading authority for requiring privity, 
and in that case it was partly because Judge Cardozo felt that the effect 
of words is less foreseeable that he was induced to require privity.22 This 
argument, however, is at most a generalization as to the widely different 
kinds of factual situations that can arise; it is not possible in all instances 
to say that injuries due to misrepresentation are less foreseeable than 
17 Historically, liability has been limited to parties in privity (e.g., Landcll v. Lybrand, 
264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919); LeLicvrc v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491) or to known third 
parties (e.g., Dickie v. Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890); Glanzer v. Shepard, 
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922)), but history alone is not a sufficient justification. 
18 Principal case at 830. 
19 E.g., Meck, supra note 2, at 388; Smith, supra note 2, at 193. 
20 E.g., Comment, Liability for Negligent Misstatements, 78 L.Q. REv. 107 (1962). 
21 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). 
22 "A force or instrument of harm having been launched with potentialities of danger 
manifest to the eye of prudence, the one who launches it is under a duty to keep it 
within bounds .... [W]hcther the potentialities of danger that will charge with liability 
are confined to harm to the person, or include injury to property ... , what is released 
or set in motion is a physical force. \Ve are now asked to say that a like liability attaches 
to the circulation of a thought or a release of the explosive power resident in words." 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 181, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931). 
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other losses caused by negligence. For example, the facts of the Ultramares 
case illustrate the validity of the argument, while those of the principal 
case indicate that it does not always hold true. In Ultramares the defend-
ants, public accountants, prepared and certified numerous copies of a 
corporate balance sheet which they knew would be shown to banks, 
creditors, stockholders, purchasers, and sellers, but they did not know by 
whom or for what purposes they would actually be used.23 In the principal 
case, however, the report issued by the defendants was for a specific rather 
than a general purpose. Since it was to be distributed to only one group, 
defendants, as designers of the sewage system that was to be bid on, could 
have more easily predicted the kind and extent of possible injuries. 
The second justification for limiting the scope of liability for misrep-
resentation is based on a different distinction between the kinds of 
negligent injuries. Because personal injury and property damage are 
usually caused by physical forces, there is often a rough correlation be-
tween the magnitude of the force negligently released and the extent of 
the resulting injury. When words are the cause of tortious injury there is 
frequently no such correlation. In Ultramares, for example, the defendants 
failed to examine the books of the corporation closely enough or to inquire 
as fully as they should have. Only on appeal was a judgment against them 
for over 186,000 dollars reversed.24 This rationale, like the first, seems 
therefore to have validity in the context of the Ultramares type of fact 
situation, and it was precisely this fear of disproportionate liability which 
moved the court of appeals to retain the requirement of privity in Ultra-
mares. Judge Cardozo felt that abandoning privity would subject many 
professional persons to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an in-
determinate time to an indeterminate class."25 The facts of the principal 
case, however, show that this justification, like the other, is not applicable 
to all misrepresentations. Defendant, through sheer carelessness, omitted 
the data which would have properly informed plaintiff of the relevant soil 
conditions. It does not seem shocking that such negligence caused defend-
ant to sustain a judgment of about 17,000 dollars.26 
By comparing the facts of the Ultramares case with those of the princi-
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
!!Ii Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. The court stated further: "Liability for negligence if 
adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers who 
certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds with knowledge 
that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the 
investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent as if the 
controversy were one between client and adviser. Title companies insuring titles to a tract 
of land, with knowledge that at an approaching auction the fact that they have insured 
will be stated to the bidders, will become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit 
of a policy without payment of a premium. These illustrations may seem to be extreme, 
but they go little, if any, farther than we are invited to go now." Id. at 188, 174 N.E. 
at 447. 
20 Principal case at 826, 837. 
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pal case, it appears that, although they reached opposite conclusions on 
the issue of whether there must be privity, both were correctly decided in 
view of their particular circumstances. In Ultramares, privity operated to 
prevent a staggering liability for a loss which was foreseeable only in a 
very general way. In the principal case, however, abolition of the privity 
requirement resulted in a reasonable recovery for a clearly foreseeable 
tortious injury. It may be concluded that when the information or opinion 
is of a broad or general nature, such as a yearly balance sheet, a loss 
caused by reliance on it is more likely to be both disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the mistake and less readily foreseeable than when the 
opinion is specific. Also, when the group of persons which might rely is 
very large, it will again be more difficult to foresee the consequences, and 
the injuries are apt to exceed the magnitude of the fault.27 It must also 
be concluded that where foreseeability is difficult or the potential liability 
staggering, the distinction between personal injury or property damage 
and business or financial loss is a valid one, and that it operates to over-
come the otherwise persuasive force of the proposition that he who erred 
should pay. Being thus left half with privity and half without, the question 
becomes whether there are other policies which might justify either whole-
sale acceptance or abandonment of the privity requirement. 
In defense of the stand taken in the principal case, it has been stated 
several times that unlimited liability need not be feared, because the 
accountant, engineer, lawyer, or other professional adviser can limit his 
1·esponsibility by qualifying his report or by limiting its uses.28 The court 
in the principal case suggested that, in view of these possibilities, Cardozo 
was tilting at windmills when he envisioned indeterminate liability.29 That 
same court, however, held ineffectual a disclaimer which defendants had 
attached to their report,30 on the grounds that the defendants could rea-
sonably have foreseen that bidders would receive and rely upon the re-
port,31 and that plaintiff had justifiably so relied despite the disclaimer.32 
If this is to be the judicial reception of attempts to qualify and restrict 
27 These factors seem to have been contemplated by the authors of the Restatement, 
although their phrasing is somewhat different: "In the majority of situations the identity 
of the person for whose guidance the information is supplied is of no moment to the 
person who supplies it, although the nature and extent of the transaction for guidance 
in which the information is to be transmitted is vitally important. This is so since the 
risk of liability to which the supplier subjects himself by undertaking to supply the 
information, while not affected by the identity of the person for whose guidance it is 
given, is vitally affected by the nature and extent of the transaction in which it is to be 
used." 3 REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 552, comment g (1938). (Emphasis added.) 
28 Meek, supra note 2, at 389; Comment, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 858, 869 (1931). See also 
3 REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 27. 
29 Principal case at 833-34. 
30 " 'This information is not guaranteed and any bids submitted must be based on 
the bidder's own investigations and determinations.'" Id. at 832. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Id. at 835-36. 
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professional opm1ons and information, Judge Cardozo's trepidations can 
scarcely be thought misguided. 
It has also been suggested that allowing third parties to sue for negli-
gent misrepresentation would not unduly burden prospective defendants 
because they can insure against the loss.33 It should be realized, however, 
that insurance is not a panacea for problems of risk distribution. Insurance 
operates most efficiently to soften the shock of losses when the contingen-
cies to be insured against are sufficiently numerous and similar to provide 
reliable actuarial data.34 It can be seriously doubted whether there would 
ever be enough claims based on negligent misrepresentation to provide 
accurate data, particularly since the risks of accountants are likely to be 
sufficiently different from those of engineers or attorneys to preclude 
grouping all such professionals into one risk group.35 The result of in-
sufficient actuarial data would likely be that insurance companies would 
either refuse to issue policies or charge exorbitant rates. For example, de-
spite the fact that engineers have been strictly liable under the Securities 
Act since 193336 and have been held liable for personal injury and property 
damage with fair frequency,37 only recently has an insurance company made 
public liability insurance available to them.88 If such insurance, though 
offered, proved excessively expensive, the result would be to drive up the 
fees of insured professionals, perhaps high enough to prevent their services 
from being as readily available as they are at present. Persons who would 
otherwise employ such professionals might tum to uninsured professionals 
of inferior competence, or go without expert advice and assistance. More-
over, there would be a good chance that the policies issued to the pro-
fessions would not cover all liabilities, and large judgments might still 
ruin many professional partnerships. A recent study shows that even in the 
area of medical malpractice, where insurance coverage is well established 
and data reasonably reliable, present policies are subject to widely different 
interpretations and do not always protect doctors adequately.39 Insurance, 
therefore, will probably not prevent professional advisers from being sub-
jected to staggering liabilities. 
Another standard justification for fault liability is that it induces those 
who control the instruments of harm to be more careful. Although gener-
83 E.g., Comment, supra note 28, at 869. 
84. Illustrative of the amount of data necessary for accurate computation of insurance 
risks is the fact that 1,084 automobile accident claims are deemed necessary to provide 
fully credible actuarial data. Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-the 
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 564 (1961). 
85 A recent symposium of ten articles and four comments on professional negligence 
liability shows dramatically how different the risks of the various professions are. 12 
V AND. L. R.Ev. 535-850 (1959). 
86 48 Stat. 82, § ll(a)(4) (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k a (4) (1958). 
87 Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. R.Ev. 711 
(1959). 
88 Ibid. 
so Hirsh, Insuring Against Medical Professional Liability, 12 VAND. L. R.Ev. 667 (1959). 
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ally valid, this rationale may be of little weight here. Professional advisers 
and specialists almost always work by special contract. Their ability to 
demand and receive high fees depends upon the quality of their past per-
formance and their reputation. Thus, whether they are held liable for their 
negligent misstatements or not, these persons have a great incentive to 
minimize errors. 
In the principal case the court noted that, in the thirty years since the 
Ultramares decision, the growing complexity and specialization in our 
economy has necessitated increased reliance upon the representations of 
specialists.40 This matter of judicial notice is treated as an additional rea-
son for imposing liability for negligent misrepresentations, the thought 
being that an enterprise should pay for the risks it creates. Again, this 
argument is persuasive, but only so long as the professions can bear the 
burden. In view of the substantial possibility that liability for negligent 
misrepresentations, unbounded by the requirement of privity, might ruin 
many specialists and unreasonably raise the prices of others, a different 
conclusion seems warranted. Indeed, the fact that professional advisers 
have become essential to many businesses militates against such an exten-
sion of the scope of their liability; it might be better social policy to assure 
the availability of professional advice even though the result is to rest the 
burden of negligent misrepresentations upon parties who rely on such 
advice for their own ends without paying for it. 
The requirement of privity as set out by Cardozo in Ultramares has been 
roundly criticized.41 If its principal justification is that it prevents the 
imposition of staggering or unforeseeable liability, it must be admitted 
that it is a rather crude device. There seems no logical reason why the 
existence or non-existence of contractual relations with the misrepresenter 
should provide the basis for distinguishing instances where liability is 
justifiable from those where it is not. Rather, the better approach would 
be twofold, relying upon both the legislative and judicial processes. The 
legislature is the best equipped organ of government for making the kind 
of exhaustive study necessary in order to determine which of the various 
advisory professions are generally most apt to be subjected to dangerously 
burdensome liability. The legislature is also the proper organ of govern-
ment to weigh the social utility of the professions and determine which 
are so important to society that it is more desirable to insure the easy 
availability of their services, by granting them partial immunity from 
liability for their negligence, than to make them pay for all the injuries 
they cause. However, since the problem of foreseeability is one that neces-
sarily depends upon the facts of specific instances, the judicial process is 
better suited to making the individual evaluations necessary to insure that 
40 Principal case at 833. 
41 See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 2; Meek, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 28. 
The illogic, overlap, and inconsistency of legal ideas in the area of misrepresentation 
has, on the other hand, been thought beneficial and desirable. Green, Deceit, supra note 2. 
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professional persons are held liable only for those injuries they could have 
reasonably predicted. "\,Vhether this determination is made by the judge or 
the jury, the trier of fact should be apprised of the special problems in-
herent in attributing losses to the effects of negligent words rather than 
negligent acts. Although the legal standard of foreseeability should be the 
same, an appreciation of the qualitatively different circumstances in which 
most representations are made would ordinarily mean that injuries due to 
words would less often be found foreseeable than injuries for which phy-
sical forces are the instruments of harm. Just as foreseeability presents 
different problems in product liability cases than in attractive nuisance or 
automobile collision cases, so too are the problems different in misrepre-
sentation cases. 
The legislatures of some states have abolished the privity requirement 
for certain professions while retaining it for others.42 Perhaps because the 
legislature failed to act on the problem, the Supreme Court of California 
recently announced a flexible judicial rule designed to apply the privity 
requirement only when warranted by both broad policy and specific cir-
cumstances. 43 Other courts are likely to follow this lead. These trends 
indicate that the law of misrepresentation is in flux on the question of the 
scope of liability, and although the approach here suggested might be 
better in the long run, for some years hence there is likely to be great 
diversity among the states. Some states will continue to accept the rule of 
the Ultramares case and require privity in all instances, while others, like 
the court in the principal case, will abolish it entirely. Hopefully more 
will move to the wiser middle ground. 
Leon E. Irish 
42 See Arnold &: Co. v. Barner, 91 Kan. 768, 139 Pac. 404 (1914); Gate City Abstract 
Co. v. Post, 55 Neb. 742, 76 N.W. 471 (1898); Sackett v. Rose, 55 Okla. 398, 154 Pac. 
1177 (1916). 
43 "The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable 
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various 
factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect 
the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and 
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct and the policy 
of preventing future harm." Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 648, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). 
Sec also Lucas v. Ham, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). 
